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T H E S I S.
THE LIABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR THE
NEGLIGENCE OF A SERVANT.
Presented by
FREDERICK LUTHER TAYLOR,
For the Degree of
BACHELOR OF LAWS.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
1896.
In discussing the liability of a municipal corp-
oration for the negligence of a servant, I propose to
deal with a particular case which has actually arisen in
practice, but which has not as yet been disposed of in
the Courts.
This discussion will necessarily embrace the fun-
damental principles which enter into all cases against
municipalities; and I propose especially to compare and
distinguish the New York cases which appear to have
established precedents in cases of similar nature.
In discussing the case in question, I propose to
show that the defendant, the City of Brooklyn, should
be held liable for negligence, and my efforts to re-
concile the cases, and my reasoning throughout will be
with the aim of eventually showing such to be the case.
In the primary discussion of the facts, I shall also
necessarily set forth the terms of the contract which
existed between the city and a contractor, and endeavor
to show the weight and effect of the provisions of
said contract, before discussing the doctrine respon-
deat superior, under which I will endeavor to fix
the liability of the City.
The facts of the case appear as follows: Up to 1894
drainage was provided for the portion of the City of
Brooklyn through which Greene Avenue passes, by a
system of sewerage which, in that year proved its in-
adequacy by failing to carry off the flow of water
caused by ordinary storms. The property owners made
complaint, and subsequently a contract was entered into
for the establishment of an auxiliary system of sewers,
a branch of which was to run through said Greene Avenue.
The contract was entered into by the Mayor and
Commissioner of Public Works, as representatives of the
City of Brooklyn, and a contractor, who was to perform
the work according to provisions hereinafter set forth.
The contract provided that the work be carried on in pur-
suance of plans and specifications filed in the office
of the Commissioner of Public Works.
And in following these plans, the contractor caused
a trench forty-seven feet in depth to be dug through
Greene Avenue, and in consequence of the improper or
negligent construction of the sewer and by virtue of
improperly shoring and walling up said trench the pro-
perty of adjoining property owners has been greatly
damaged by the settling of their lands and attendant
damages caused by the caving and settling of the ground
surrounding said trench.
Among other provisions of the contract providing
for the supervision, inspection, and general direction
of the work by the City officers, appear the following:
(1) "The department of Public Works shall be, and is
hereby authorized, by its Chief Engineer, or such other
errson or persons, or in such manner as it may deem
proper, to inspect the materials to be furnished and the
work to be done under this agreement and to see that
the same correspond to the specifications."
This provision in the event of any drainage occuring
by virtue of poor materials, or by poor work not com-
plying with the specifications, would, it is beyond
controversy, operate to make the city directly respon-
sible therefor.
(2) Section 14 of Specification provides that
"All work of every kind and nature to be done under
this contract to complete the drainage of the said
section 2 of the Main Relief Sewer extension, shall
be done according to the exibits on said maps and
plans, and the plans, models, and descriptions or
specifications on file in the office of said Commissioner
and in accordance with all the directions of the Engineer
of said Commissioner. And said Commissioner reserved
to himself the right, and it is expressly agreed by the
said party of the second part, that the said Commissioner
may change at his discretion the amount of all the
various kinds of work ard materials and structures and
may decrease or increase the amount of money to be paid
the said party of the second part under this contract,
according to the several prices herein Stated."
This provision evidences the fact that the contract-
or is not acting independently, but is carrying out the
work according to plans laid out by the City,who may
in its discretion, change the amount of work, materials
or structure. The most noteworthy function of this
provision is to give to the City Engineer express power
to direct the manner of performing the work.
The contract contains also a clause setting forth
that whenever the term "Engineer" is used it refers
both to the Chief Engineer of the department of City
works, and his authorized agents; and all explanations
and directions necessary to carrying out and completing
satisfactorily the different descriptions of work con-
templated and provided for under this contract, will be
given by said Engineer.
However, the clause of the contract which is of
most import in fixing the responsibility for the damage
under discussion, is Section 25, which reads as follows:
"If any person employed by the contractor on the
works shall appear to the Engineer to be incompetent or
disorderly, he shall be discharged immediately upon the
requisition of the Engineer; and such person shall not
again be employed upon them without permission."
The weight of this provision will be set forth in
the ensuing discussion of the liability of the City for
the damage as before discribed.
By force of these provisions, as heretofore set
forth, the City of Brooklyn is expressly vested with the
following powers as to the overseeing of proper perform-
mance of the contract:
(1) The power to discharge employees engaged by the
contractor.
(2) Power to direct the manner of performance of
the work.
(3) Power to pass upon the quality of materials
used and to discard them if not in compliance with the
specifications.
In discussing the liability of the city under the
doctrine respondeat superior, it is necessary to pri-
marily determine whether the contractor in the case was
the servant of the city of Brooklyn only, or of the
public at large.
Has the City, in obedience with a Legislative act,
appointed this contractor to perform a public service
in which the Corporation has no private interest or
benefit, or has the City chosen him in compliance with
her own resolutions and wishes ?
If the former is the case, the doctrine respondeat
superior must be abandoned, but if the latter be true,
we may apply the doctrine.
This question is exhaustively discussed in the case
of Maximilian vs. The Mayor, 62 N.Y. 160. The facts in
this case involved the injury of an individull through
negligence of the driver of an ambulance. The Court
holds:
1. That the rule of respondeat superior is based
upon the right which an employer has to engage and dis-
charge his servants with regard to their skillfullness
or behavior.
II. If the act of a subordinate appointed by the
municipality is done in the attempted performance of a
duty laid by the law upon him and not upon the munici-
pality, then the municipality is not liable for his
negligence, and
III. Where a municipal corporation, in obedience
to an act of the Legislature, elects or appoints an
officer to perform a public service in which the corpor-
ation has no private interest, and from which it derives
no special benefit or advantage in its official capacity,
such officer cannot be regarded as the servant of the
corporation. Acting on these principles the Court held
that the driver of the ambulance was not a servant of the
City of New York, and arrived at that conclusion as
follows:
FIRST. The ambulance driver was under the direct-
ion and control of the Commissioners of Corrections
and Charities, who had sole power to employ and dis-
charge such servants.
SECOND. The Commissioners of Charities and Cor-
rections, although becoming imbued with their official
power from a circumscribed locality, are public offiers
discharging public duties laid by law on them for the
benefit of the general public.
THIRD. The City of Brooklyn receives no emolument
from the acts of these commissioners, and is in no way
benefited thereby, as a corporation.
It seems, however, that the findings in the above
case will in no way tend to remove the City from lia-
bility where the wrong complained of is the negligent
or unskilled act of one employed under the Supervision
of the City Engineer, and engaged in work directly
benefiting the City, as does the construction of sewers.
The reasoning upon which the City was held not to
be liable, (in Maximilian vs. The Mayor), can be sup-
planted by the determination of three questions, in
distinguishing the case at bar.
(1) Did the City of Brooklyn act under Legislative
compulsion or under authority issuing from the combined
acts of the Common Council and Commissioner of Public
works ?
The contract was made under Laws of 1888, and the
question is answered by the provision of Sec. 25, Title
XV of said Laws, which reads as follows: "The Commission-
er of Public Works has power to establish storm sewers
where he deems necessary, subject to the approval of the
Common Council.
Section 27 Title XV of the Laws of 1888, reads in
substance as follows: "Where the Common Council of the
City of Brooklyn have approved by resolution any plans
for the perfecting of sewerage, presented by the Com-
missioner of Public Works, it shall be his duty to pro-
ceed and construct said sewers."
(2) Did the power to employ and discharge servants
employed in the construction of the sewer lay with the
City or otherwise ?
In the case at bar, by the express terms of the
contract, this power was vested in the city.
Under this state of facts, it is unquestionably
clear that the contractor is the servant of the City of
Brooklyn, and not of the general public, as is an am-
bulance driver.
(3) Did the City receive benefit, as a municipal
corporation, by the construction of the sewer system ?
Obviously it appears that this is an improvement
for the benefit of the City of Brooklyn, and for the
City of Brooklyn alone. The distinction between the case
at bar and the case of Maximilian vs. The Mayor is too
plain to need be discussed.
Where the duty of the City is ministerial, not
judicial or legislative, the corporation is liable for
all damage resulting from its acts; whereas, in the
former instance, the City is not so liable. Now I pur-
pose dealing with the specific act of the City in con-
structing a sewer, and showing such to be held a
purely ministerial duty.
The Case of Barton vs. The City of Syracuse, (36
N.Y. 54), holds that in the construction of sewers, and
in keeping them in repair, municipal corporations act
ministerially, and are bound to exercise needful dili-
gence, prudence and care concerning them, ard that the
City is liable for damages to adjoining property owners
whether or not the City has notice of the defects.
Dillon on Municipal Corporations, (Vol. 2, 1333),
holds that the work of constructing drains is a minis-
terial duty, and cites :
Mills vs. City of Brooklyn, 32 N.Y. 489.
Barton vs. City of Syracuse,36 N.Y. 54.
The case of Seifert vs. City of Brooklyn seems to
be a leading case, and in general outline accords with
the case of Barton vs. City of Syracuse, which is cited
above and previously quoted.
In the case of Evers vs. Long Island City, the Court
remarks that "The duty resting upon a Municipal Corp-
oration to construct streets, sidewalks and sewers is
judicial in its nature, yet, after they are constructed
the duty to keep them in repair is a ministerial one.
The Court cites as authority the case of Hinds vs. City
of Lockport, (50 N.Y. 236).
However, that case does not entirely concur with
its foregoing citation, and merely says that "the duty
of keeping sewers in repair is ministerial", and does
not hold that the City is acting judicially up to the
time the sewers are"constructed", or as I imply, "fin-
ished", and only assumes a ministerial duty in keeping
the same in repair.
The case of Lloyd vs. The Mayor, (5 N.Y.369),arose
over a state of facts caused by the neglect of the ser-
vants of the City to properly guard an excavation
made in reparring a public sewer, and whereby the plain-
tiff's horse was killed by falling into the excavation.
The Court here held that the City was responsible
for the negligence of those employed to repair the
sewer. The Corporation set up in defense that a corp-
oration could not be held for the negligence of servants
it must employ. The Court in reply to this said that
such a doctrine could not prevail, for as a Corporation
could act only through agents, if such a doctrine were
in vogue, corporations would be absolved from liability
in every case. Here it is pointed out that the duty
was a ministerial one.
The case of Storrs vs. City of Utica, (17 N.Y.104)
arose upon facts as follows: A sewer for the benefit of
the City was in process of construction, and the work was
skillfully performed. However, by virtue of neglect to
properly display danger signals, the plaintiff drove
into the excavation and was injured. The Court held the
City responsible for the damage and went on to say,
That the City would, in all cases be so held liable,
even though the Corporation provided by special contract
that its agents assume responsibility for the proper
guarding of the excavation.
This conclusion seens to be arrived at by applying
the principle that one individual cannot shift the lia-
bility for a dangerous undertaking by employing an agent,
and holds that the danger arises from the very nature of
the improvement.
The Court remarks in its opinion at page 108, that
when the work is let out by contract, then the Con-
tractor alone is liable to third parties, if his servants
are negligent in tie construction work.
A case apparently in support of this proposition,
is Kelly vs. The Mayor etc. of New York, (11 N.Y. 432).
However, upon discussing this case, and comparing the cas
case at bar therewith, it will be discerned that such
a holding cannot be here applicable. The case of Kelly
vs. The Mayor etc of New York arose upon facts as
follows: The City had a contract with a contractor, by
virtue of which a certain street was to be graded.
Through the negligent blasting, or rather failure to
warn passers by of the blasting, the plaintiff was
injured. The Court held the Contractor alone liable,
and held that the City was not any more liable because
of terms in the contract providing that the work be done
under the direction and to the entire satisfaction 9f
the Commissioner of Repairs, and the surveyor having
charge of the work. In reconciling this case, we will
next review the following case, which is used as an
authority is deciding the case under condideration.
(Kelly vs. The Mayor).
The Court cites the case of Pack vs. The Mayor etc
and holds that the City is not liable upon the prin-
ciples laid down in that case. In the case about to be
considered, the facts are identical with those embodied
in the foregoing case, the contract providing that the
work be performed according to "such further directions
as may be given by the commissioner and surveyor".
Here the contractor alone is held liable, but for a
reason, as is shown by the words of the Court: "They
could not control the contractor in any respect if he
should proceed negligently. They could neither dismiss
him or control him in his work."
The case which we are now discussing, i. e. Kelly
vs. The Mayor, is decided upon the same facts and prin-
ciples, and the words of the Court, in absolving the
City foom liability are: "The clause in question clearly
gave to the corporation no power to control the con-
tractor in the choice of his servants. This right of
selection lies at the foundation of the responsibility
of the master or principal for the acts of his servant
or agent."
It is evident that the Courts absolve the City from
liability for the reason that the principle of master
and servant cannot be established where the City does
not possess the right to choose or discharge the ser-
vants for whose negligence the City is sought to be
made liable. Other principles entering into these
cases are due to questions arising in every negligence
case, the real and underlying force of the decision
being based upon the impossibility of establishing
the relationship of principal and agent between the
City and the Laborers.
In the case at bar, it is evident that, by the tern
of the contract the City of Brooklyn retained the power
to discharge incompetent servants. The words used being:
"If any person employed by the contractor on the works
ahall appear to the Engineer to be incompetent or sis-
shall be discharged immedinte1 ipan thA
requisition of the Engineer, and such person shall not
again be employed upon them without permission".
Consequently these cases cannot be construed as
opposing the proposition we are here seeking to estab-
lish i. e. that the City of Brooklyn occupies the po-
sition cf principal, as to Contractor Creem and his
operators as agent.
In the case of Kelly vs. The Mayor, and cases of
concurrent nature, the Courts seem to lay down a pro-
position which would operate to free a municipal corp-
oration from liability, notwithstanding a provision in a
contract whereby it is stipulated that the City officers
shall direct the work, or that the work be conducted
in accordance with their approval. Without the pre-
scntation of additional facts, this may be conceded to
be true, but if, in connection with this power, the
power to choose and discharge the employees is co-ex-
istent, the force of such a doctrine is entirely lost.
The case of Kelly vs. The Mayor itself practically con-
cedes this. ( See page 434.)
Assuming it to be established that the City of
Brooklyn is acting ministerially in the construction
of the sewer, and that the City is vested with express
authority to choose and discharge employees, it does
not seem possible to the writer to invent or apply any
existing doctrine with sufficient force to remove the
City from a direct responsibility for the damages under
consideration. Were such a result possible, I can see
no instance wherein a Municipal Corporation could be
held liable for negligent acts of its servants.
It is also interesting to inquire who would be
liable to adjoining property owners for the damages
they have sustained if the City were absolved from
liability. In answer to this the Corporation Counsel
may reply that the contractor is solely liable. Again
it might be argued that the contractor had given a bond
in contemplation of damages of similar character.
As to the first contention, that the contractor
solely is liable, we have only to consider the conditions
which might arise were such a doctrine sustained in order
to see its fallacy. A Municipal Corporation might,
in certain instances engage an insolvent contractor
and what recourse in such case would individuals have
for damages they might sustain ?
Now as to the giving of a bond by the contractor,
whereby he assumes a liability for such damages as we
are considering.
It is a question too clearly settled to admit of
discussion that an individual owing a duty toward
another cannot, at will, divest himself of entire
liability by inducing a third party to assume the
responsibility for his contingent mal or mis feasance.
In discussing this proposition, I have not entered
into a discussion of the authorities treating thereof.
My reason for apparently dealing lightly with this
consideration is that it was deemed, by the eminent
counsel engaged in the case, to be a question of no
importance as affecting the plaintiff's right of recovery
and that the law regarding the same was definitely
settled.
In conclusion I would say that in discussing the
propositions embodied in this case, the writer has pro-
ceeded with the sole view of establishing a case
against the City. There is, of course, a vast number
of cases which may seem to destroy the force of the
propositions I have endeavored to establish, and it is
only with the leading cases of this character that I
have dealt. I have been unable to find in the reports
of the New York Courts, a single case which is directly
or I may say at all, in point with the case I have
attempted to discuss; and my theories are therefore
based only upon general principles, and upon such
holdings as support the steps out of which I have at-
tempted to build a stairway which may lead to the ul-
timate end I have tried to establish.
